Chapter 4

The Theory of Racial Formation

Race is a way of “making up people.”¹ The very act of defining racial groups is a process fraught with confusion, contradiction, and unintended consequences. Concepts of race prove to be unreliable as supposed boundaries shift, slippages occur, realignments become evident, and new collectivities emerge. State-imposed classifications of race, for example, face continuing challenges by individuals and groups who seek to assert distinctive racial categories and identities. Historical shifts in scientific knowledge, in fields ranging from physical anthropology to the genomic sciences, fuel continuing debates about what race may or may not mean as an indicator of human variation. While such debates and reformulations regarding the concept of race initially occur in specific institutional arenas, public spaces, or academic fields, their consequences are often dramatic and reverberate broadly throughout society.

Race-making can also be understood as a process of “othering.” Defining groups of people as “other” is obviously not restricted to distinctions based on race. Gender, class, sexuality, religion, culture, language, nationality, and age, among other perceived distinctions, are frequently evoked to justify structures of inequality, differential treatment, subordinate status, and in some cases violent conflict and war. Classifying people as other, and making use of various perceived attributes in order to do so, is a universal phenomenon that also classifies (and works to amalgamate and homogenize) those who do the classifying (Blumer 1958). “Making up people” is both basic and ubiquitous. As social beings, we must categorize people so as to be able to “navigate” in the world—to discern quickly who may be friend or foe, to position and situate ourselves within prevailing social hierarchies, and to provide clues that guide our social interactions with the individuals and groups we encounter.

But while the act of categorizing people and assigning different attributes to such categories may be universal, the categories themselves are subject to enormous variation over historical time and space. The definitions, meanings, and overall coherence of prevailing social categories are always subject to multiple interpretations. No social category rises to the level of being understood as a fixed, objective, social fact.

One might imagine, for example, that the category of a person’s “age” (as measured in years) is an objective social category. But even this familiar concept’s meaning varies across time and space. In many societies where the elderly are venerated and highly valued as leaders and living repositories of wisdom, individuals tend to overstate their age in years. By contrast, people in the youth-oriented United States tend to understate how old they are. Processes of classification, including self-classification, are
reflective of specific social structures, cultural meanings and practices, and of broader power relations as well.

The definitions of specific categories are framed and contested from "above" and "below." The social identities of marginalized and subordinate groups, for example, are both imposed from above by dominant social groups and/or state institutions, and constituted from below by these groups themselves as expressions of self-identification and resistance to dominant forms of categorization. In any given historical moment, one can understand a social category's prevailing meaning, but such understandings can also be erroneous or transitory. They are often no more than the unstable and tentative result of the dynamic engagement between "elite" and "street" definitions and meanings.

Race as a Master Category

It is now widely accepted in most scholarly fields that race is a social construction. Simply stating that race is socially constructed, however, begs a number of important questions. How is race constructed? How and why do racial definitions and meanings change over time and place? And perhaps most important, what role does race play within the broader social system in which it is embedded?

With respect to this last question, we advance what may seem an audacious claim. We assert that in the United States, race is a master category—a fundamental concept that has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, the history, polity, economic structure, and culture of the United States. Obviously, some clarification is in order. We are not suggesting that race is a transcendent category—something that stands above or apart from class, gender, or other axes of inequality and difference. The literature on intersectionality has clearly demonstrated the mutual determination and co-constitution of the categories of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation. It is not possible to understand the (il)logic of any form of social stratification, any practice of cultural marginalization, or any type of inequality or human variation, without appreciating the deep, complex, comingling, interpenetration of race, class, gender, and sexuality. In the cauldron of social life, these categories come together; they are profoundly transformed in the process.

We hold these truths of intersectional analysis to be self-evident. But we also believe that race has played a unique role in the formation and historical development of the United States. Since the historical encounter of the hemispheres and the onset of transatlantic enslavement were the fundamental acts of race-making, since they launched a global and world-historical process of "making up people" that constituted the modern world, race has become the template of both difference and inequality. This is a world-historical claim, but here we develop it only in the context of the United States.

We suggest that the establishment and reproduction of different regimes of domination, inequality, and difference in the United States have consciously drawn
reproduce, or challenge racist structures. The process of race making, and its reverberations throughout the social order, is what we call racial formation. We define racial formation as the sociohistorical process by which racial identities are created, lived out, transformed, and destroyed.

Our presentation of racial formation theory proceeds in several steps. First, we provide a concept of racialization to emphasize how the phenomic, the corporeal dimension of human bodies, acquires meaning in social life. How are corporeal differences among humans apprehended and given meaning? Next, we advance the concept of racial projects to capture the simultaneous and co-constitutive ways that racial meanings are translated into social structures and become racially signified. Then, we discuss the problem of racism in an attempt to specify under what conditions a racial project can be defined as racist. Finally, we discuss racial politics, the way society is racially organized and ruled. Here, we consider racial despotism, racial democracy, and racial hegemony as frameworks for racial rule and racial resistance. We suggest that in the early 21st century the hegemonic concept of race in U.S. society is that of "colorblindness." The ideological hegemony of colorblindness, however, is extremely contradictory and shallow. It confronts widespread resistance and falls short of achieving the political stability that hegemonic projects are supposed to deliver. This chapter ends there; the post–World War II political trajectory of race is treated in detail in the chapters that follow.

Racialization

Race is often seen as a social category that is either objective or illusory. When viewed as an objective matter, race is usually understood as rooted in biological differences, ranging from such familiar phenomic markers as skin color, hair texture, or eye shape, to more obscure human variations occurring at the genetic or genomic levels. When viewed as an illusion, race is usually understood as an ideological construct, something that masks a more fundamental material distinction or axis of identity: our three paradigms of ethnicity, class, and nation typify such approaches. Thus race is often treated as a metonym or epiphenomenon of culture (in the ethnicity paradigm), inequality and stratification (in the class paradigm), or primordial peoplehood (in the nation paradigm).

On the "objective" side, race is often regarded as an essence, as something fixed and concrete. The three main racial classifications of humans once posed (and now largely rejected) by physical anthropology—Negroid, Caucasoid, and Mongoloid—are examples of such an essentialist perspective. Another example is "mixed-race" identity. To consider an individual or group as "multiracial" or mixed race presupposes the existence of clear, discernible, and discrete races that have subsequently been combined to create a hybrid, or perhaps mongrel, identity. Here race is functioning as a metonym for "species," although that connection is generally not admitted in the present day.
according to the race of the person who was not White.” In 1977, OMB Directive 15 stated that “[t]he category which most closely reflects the individual’s recognition in his community should be used for purposes of reporting on persons who are of mixed racial and/or ethnic origins.”

In an attempt to assert their multiracial heritage, some individuals ignored census instructions to “[f]ill ONE circle for the race that the person considers himself/herself to be,” by marking two or more boxes. However, since the census scanners are designed to read only one marked box, these people were reclassified as monoracial, based on whichever box was marked more firmly. In addition, individuals specifying the “Other” category are routinely reassigned to one of the OMB’s distinct racial categories based on the first race listed.

Beginning in the 1970s, various individuals and groups formally protested the notion of mutually exclusive racial categories embodied in the “single-race checkoff” policy. Much of the public pressure came from the parents of school-age multiracial children. In the public schools, a multiracial child is often faced with the dilemma of having to choose one race, and constantly risks being misclassified in this setting.

After several years of intense debate, the OMB’s Interagency Committee for the Review of the Racial and Ethnic Standards rejected the proposal to add a separate multiracial category. Instead, in July 1997, the 30-agency task force recommended that Directive 15 be amended to permit multiracial Americans to “mark one or more” racial category when identifying themselves for the census and other government programs. At first, most of the major civil rights organizations, such as the Urban League and the National Council of La Raza, along with groups such as the National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders, opposed a multiracial category. These groups feared a diminution in their numbers, and worried that a multiracial category would spur debates regarding the “protected status” of groups and individuals. According to various estimates, from 75 to 90 percent of those who checked the “black” box could potentially check a multiracial one if it were an option. Concerned about the possible reductions in group numbers, civil rights groups argued that existing federal civil rights laws and programs were based on exclusive membership in a defined racial/ethnic group. It would be difficult, if not impossible, from this angle, to assess the salience of multiraciality in relationship to these laws and programs. The “mark one or more” option was adopted in Census 2000.

Racial Projects

Race is a “crossroads” where social structure and cultural representation meet. Too often, the attempt is made to understand race simply or primarily in terms of only one of these two analytical dimensions. For example, efforts to explain racial inequality as a purely social structural phenomenon either neglect or are unable to account for the origins, patterning, and transformation of racial meanings, representations, and social identities. Conversely, many examinations of race as a system of signification,
identity, or cultural attribution fail adequately to articulate these phenomena with evolving social structures (such as segregation or stratification) and institutions (such as prisons, schools, or the labor market).

Race can never be merely a concept or idea, a representation or signification alone. Indeed race cannot be discussed, cannot even be noticed, without reference—however explicit or implicit—to social structure. To identify an individual or group racially is to locate them within a socially and historically demarcated set of demographic and cultural boundaries, state activities, "life-chances," and tropes of identity/difference/(in)equality. Race is both a social/historical structure and a set of accumulated signifiers that suffuse individual and collective identities, inform social practices, shape institutions and communities, demarcate social boundaries, and organize the distribution of resources. We cannot understand how racial representations set up patterns of residential segregation, for example, without considering how segregation reciprocally shapes and reinforces the meaning of race itself.

We conceive of racial formation processes as occurring through a linkage between structure and signification. Racial projects do both the ideological and the practical "work" of making these links and articulating the connection between them. A racial project is simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial identities and meanings, and an effort to organize and distribute resources (economic, political, cultural) along particular racial lines. Racial projects connect what race means in a particular discursive or ideological practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning. Racial projects are attempts both to shape the ways in which social structures are racially signified and the ways that racial meanings are embedded in social structures.

Racial projects occur at varying scales, both large and small. Projects take shape not only at the macro-level of racial policy-making, state activity, and collective action, but also at the level of everyday experience and personal interaction. Both dominant and subordinate groups and individual actors, both institutions and persons, carry out racial projects. The imposition of restrictive state voting rights laws, organizing work for immigrants', prisoners', and community health rights in the ghetto or barrio are all examples of racial projects. Individuals' practices may be seen as racial projects as well: The cop who "stops and frisks" a young pedestrian, the student who joins a memorial march for the slain teenager Trayvon Martin, even the decision to wear dreadlocks, can all be understood as racial projects. Such projects should not, however, be simply regarded and analyzed as discrete, separate, and autonomous ideas and actions. Every racial project is both a reflection of and response to the broader patterning of race in the overall social system. In turn, every racial project attempts to reproduce, extend, subvert, or directly challenge that system.

Racial projects are not necessarily confined to particular domains. They can, for example, "jump" scale in their impact and significance. Projects framed at the local level, for example, can end up influencing national policies and initiatives. Correspondingly, projects at the national or even global level can be creatively and strategically
recast at regional and local levels. Projects “travel” as well. Consider how migration recasts concepts of race, racial meaning, and racial identity: Immigrants’ notions of race are often shaped in reference to, and in dialogue with, concepts of race in both their countries of origin and settlement. Thus migrants can maintain, adopt, and strategically utilize different concepts of race in transnational space (Kim 2008; Roth 2012).

At any given historical moment, racial projects compete and overlap, evincing varying capacity either to maintain or to challenge the prevailing racial system. A good example is the current debate over the relevance of “colorblind” ideology, policy, and practice; this provides a study of overlapping and competing racial projects. We discuss the hegemony of colorblindness in the concluding section of this book.

Racial projects link signification and structure not only in order to shape policy or exercise political influence, but also to organize our understandings of race as everyday “common sense.” To see racial projects operating at the level of everyday life, we have only to examine the many ways in which we “notice” race, often unconsciously.

One of the first things we notice about people when we meet them (along with their sex) is their race. We utilize race to provide clues about who a person is. This fact is made painfully obvious when we encounter someone whom we cannot conveniently racially categorize—someone who is, for example, racially “mixed” or of an ethnic/racial group with which we are not familiar. Such an encounter becomes a source of discomfort and momentarily a crisis of racial meaning.

Our ability to interpret racial meanings depends on preconceived notions of a racialized social structure. Comments such as “Funny, you don’t look black” betray an underlying image of what black should look like. We expect people to act out their apparent racial identities. Phenotype and performativity should match up. Indeed we become disoriented and anxious when they do not. Encounters with the black person who can’t dance, the Asian American not proficient in math and science, or the Latin@ who can’t speak Spanish all momentarily confound our racial reading of the social world and how we navigate within it. The whole gamut of racial stereotypes testifies to the way a racialized social structure shapes racial experience and socializes racial meanings. Analysis of prevailing stereotypes reveals the always present, already active link between our view of the social structure—its demography, its laws, its customs, its threats—and our conception of what race means.

Conversely, the way we interpret our experience in racial terms shapes and reflects our relations to the institutions and organizations through which we are embedded in the social structure. Thus we expect racially coded human characteristics to explain social differences. “Making up people” once again. Temperament, sexuality, intelligence, athletic ability, aesthetic preferences are presumed to be fixed and discernible from the palpable mark of race. Such diverse questions as our confidence and trust in others (for example, salespeople, teachers, media figures, and neighbors), our sexual preferences and romantic images, our tastes in music, films, dance, or sports, and our very ways of talking, walking, eating, and dreaming become racially coded simply because we live in a society where racial awareness is so pervasive.