Vadim Batitsky

Associate Professor


Ph.D., Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, 1996
M.A., Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, 1993
B.A., summa cum laude, Philosophy, California State University at Los Angeles, 1989


Philosophy of science
Philosophy of mathematics
Philosophy of mind
Philosophy of computation

Vadim Batitsky has been a member of the Philosophy Department since 1996.  His research interests focus on the metaphysical and epistemological problems at the intersection of philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of mind. He is especially interested in trying to understand and sort out the ways in which highly abstract and idealized mathematical models can be useful in predicting and explaining the behavior of empirical systems. In pursuing this goal, Dr. Batitsky always tries to make the relevant philosophical questions more precise by modeling them in suitable mathematical frameworks, such as measurement theory, dynamical systems theory, automata theory, and computational complexity theory.

“Chaos, Complexity and Indeterminism” (with Z. Domotor), Indeterminacy: The Mapped, the Navigable, and the Uncharted (edited by J. Ciprut) (MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2009), 151–70.

“The Analytic versus Representational Theory of Measurement: A Philosophy of Science Perspective” (with Z. Domotor),  Measurement Science Review 8 (2008), 129–46.

“When good theories make bad predictions” (with Z. Domotor), Synthese 157 (2007), 79–103.

“Some measurement-theoretic concerns about Hale’s ‘Reals by Abstraction,’” Philosophia Mathematica 10(3) (2002), 286–303.

“Measurement in Carnap’s late philosophy of science,” Dialectica 54(2) (2000), 87–108.

“A formal rebuttal of the central argument for functionalism,” Erkenntnis 49(2) (1998), 201–20.

“Empiricism and the myth of fundamental measurement,” Synthese 116(1) (1998), 51–73.