St. John's Law Review

Three Limitations of Twombly: Antitrust Conspiracy Inferences in a Context of Historical Monopoly

By: J. Douglas Richards

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court has thrown litigants and lower courts into confusion, by consigning to the dustbin, key phraseology from Conley v. Gibson, which had served as a guiding light on motions to dismiss for half a century—a motion to dismiss should not granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”  Although some believe that this rejection represents a cataclysmic change in the legal landscape, other decisions rendered by the Court since Twombly indicate, however, that fears of a major legal earthquake are overblown.
 
The Twombly opinion confines itself narrowly to the specific question and context presented, and does little to explain whether or how broadly the standards that it articulates for the case at hand should be applied in other contexts.  The contention of this Article is that to the extent that Twombly raises the bar for pleading of a complaint, it does so only in the very narrow context of (1) antitrust conspiracy complaints; (2) only when those complaints explicitly rest allegations of conspiracy on pleaded inferences rather than factual allegations; (3) in the unique historical context of the telecommunications industry.  Lower courts should not assume that Twombly supports or portends significant changes in other contexts, unless and until the Supreme Court so states if a future case.